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Abstract 
In this pa�, we suggest marrying Dempster-Shafer (DS) 
theory w1th Knowledge Representation (KR). Born out 
of this marriage is the defmition of "Dempster-Shafer 
Belief Bases", abstract data types representing uncertain 
knowledge that use DS theory for representing strength of 
belief about our knowledge, and the linguistic structures 
of an arbitrary KR system for representing the knowledge 
itself. A formal result guarantees that both the properties 
of the given KR system and of DS theory are preserved. 
The general model is exemplified by defming DS Belief 
Bases where First Order Logic and (an extension of) 
KRYPTON are used as KR systems. The implementation 
problem is also touched upon. 
1. Introduction 
Dempster-Shafer (hereafter, DS) theory of evidence is a 
mathematical setting for expressing the strength of our 
belief over a set of possible hypotheses (Shafer, 1976; 
Smets, 1988). In a nutshell, a unitary amount of belief 
("belief mass') is distributed among the subsets of a set 
8 of (exhaustive and mutually exclusive) hypotheses, 
called the frame of discernment. A Basic Probability 
Assignment (BPA) over 8 is a function specifying how 
heavy a mass of belief is being allocated to each of its 
subsets. A belief junction bel,. is then defmed on the 
subsets of 8: intuitively, bel,.(A) measures the maxi­
mum amount of belief that can be allocated to A accord­
ing tom. Two BPA's on the same space of hypotheses, 
corresponding to two distinct bodies of evidence, may 
be combined into a new BPA by means of Dempster's 
rule of combination. Acquisition of new evidence is 
typically performed by combining a pre-existing BPA 
with a new BPA representing the impact of the new 
evidence alone. A most popular use of DS theory in AI 
is well exemplified by what has been called the 
"multivariate formalism" (Kong, 1986): the problem we 
want to deal with is represented through a number of 
variables, associated to the relevant elements of the 
problem. Each variable is allowed to take a number of 
alternative values, and BPA's are defmed over the sets 
of these values. A relation among different elements is 
expressed by defming a BPA on the product space of 
the (values of the) corresponding variables. Once we 
• This rcacarch has been partially supported by the ARCHON 
project, funded by grants from the Commission of the European 
Communities under tbe ESPRIT-II Program, P-2256. 
have modelled a problem this way, a DS solution is 
found by computing an overall BPA-the combination 
of all the available BPA's (i.e. those expressing prior 
belief, those expressing relations, and those expressing 
acquired evidence)-on the overall space of values for 
all the variables. From this BPA, a measure of belief 
for the (sets ot) values of each interesting variable can 
be computed. 
Expressive power and epistemic adequacy have often 
been acknowledged to DS theory in AI. Unfortunately, 
uncertainty representation is but one side of the problem 
of formalizing uncertain knowledge: in particular, the 
knowledge itself, which uncertainty refers to, has to be 
represented. If we take the point of view of Knowledge 
Representation (KR), we may drive the conclusion that 
DS theory is not an adequate tool for expressing general 
or domain specific knowledie. Different types of 
knowledge have continuously been identified in the KR 
tradition (see e.g. Israel & Brachman, 1981; Brachman 
& Levesque, 1982); to wit, the four statements 
- Elephants are manunals with four legs 
- All of my friends like jazz music 
- Normally, birds fly 
- Smoke suggests fire 
express four qualitatively different types of knowledge. 
A number of efforts have normally been devoted in KR 
to the development of representation formalisms able to 
capture (and discriminate) different types of knowl­
edge. Yet, in aDS framework, all the four statements 
above would most probably be expressed by a single 
pattern, namely a BPA on the product space of two ap­
propriate variables (or a conditional belief function 
bel(AIB) over it). Moreover, representing even simple 
patterns of generic knowledge in a DS framework may 
become highly problematic: e.g., consider representing 
the fact that parents are humans that have at least one 
child (notice that this fact would be easily represented in 
most KR system). 
In this paper we try to blm DS theory to KR. We do 
this by defming a formal framework which uses OS 
theory for representing strength of belief about our 
knowledge, and the linguistic structures of an arbitrary 
KR language for representing the knowledge itself. The 
key concept consists in the distinction between the lan­
guage we use for representing knowledge, peculiar of 
the given KR system, and the knowledge actually rep­
resented. This knowledge will be modelled by abstract 
objects (propositions), and belief about it will be ex-
pressed as BPA's on these objects (rather than on the 
sentences of the KR language). As a consequence\ our 
framework will be independent of the particular KR 
system we intend to use, regarded as a parameter. In 
order to settle down our framework in a general way, 
we will adhere to the "functional approach" advocated 
by Levesque (1984), and define "Dempster-Shafer 
Belief Bases" as abstract data types representing a 
(uncertainly) believed corpus of knowledge. In them, 
knowledge and belief about this knowledge will be rep­
resented according to a specific KR language and to DS 
theory, respectively. 
The rest paper is organized as follows. Propositions, 
and the way we use them to bridge DS theory and KR 
systems, are presented in Section 2. Section 3 gives the 
formal account of Belief Bases, together with some re­
sults showing their "good behaviour". Section 4 shows 
two possible ways (model-theoretic and proof-theo­
retic) of modelling Belief Bases; also, it illustrates their 
use and behaviour by giving some examples. Section 5 
deals with the possibility to turn the proposed frame­
work into a (implementable) hybrid system. Section 6 
discusses some related work, and concludes. 
2. The Objects of Belief 
In introducing our framework in the above section, the 
word "knowledge" has been used in two ways: to de­
note the objects which we entertain belief in; and to de­
note the objects represented by a KR language. We 
analyse in this section how these "objects" can be 
modelled in an abstract way, and how they can become 
the link between DS theory and a KR system. 
We identify items of knowledge with elements of a 
set 'f of "propositions"t. In order for 'f to be a good 
candidate for our goal, we actually require it to be a 
Boolean algebra; we denote by � its partial order, by 
(1 its infimum, by c its complement, and by U. and 0 
its top and bottom elements, respectively. Given ele­
ments P and Q of , , we read "P � Q" as P logically 
entails Q, "P (i Q" as the conjunction of P and Q, Cp as 
the negation of P, U. as the tautology and 0 as the false 
proposition of 'f. Propositions are the right objects to 
asses belief to, so we will defme a DS calculus on 'f in 
the next section. However, we want to express our 
knowledge through the sentences of a generic KR 
language: the problem we face is then how to map sen­
tences of this language to the propositions they con­
note. We will suggest that providing this mapping ac­
tually constitutes the role of the KR system in the 
1 We remind that, after Frege, the.p,opo$ition connoled by a 
sentence is its $erLJe, its �aning. The reader should never con­
fuse prop<llitioos with sentences which express them; nor should 
she confuse them with propositional symbols, or any other ayn­
sactical element of any pven language. Propositions are the � 
tm11 of the sentences. 
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framework that we are defining; but we flJ'St need to 
spend a few words on KR systems and their semantics. 
The most popular way to formally describe a KR 
system ! is to defme a formal system based on the lan­
guage �:t of I:. There are basically two approaches to 
formalizing such a system, namely the model-theoretic 
and the proof-theoretic ones. The first approach con-
sists in providing a truth relation lo I. for I., which de-
fmes the notion of "truth" of sentences of �:t with re­
spect to elements of a given class of mathematical 
structures, used as models of the language. The second 
approach consists in providing I: with a deduction rela­
tion 1-:t that specifies which sentences can be deduced 
by which ones through the deductive apparatus of I: 
(normally a set of axioms and inference rules). 
Correspondingly, we indicate a (formal account of a) 
KR system by I:= (�:t' ._:E) or by I= (Z::t' 1-:t). For 
the goals of this paper, we regard the role of a KR sys­
tem I as that of 1) providing a KR language �:t' and 
2) mapping each sentence of Z:t to the proposition it 
connotes (i.e. attributing a meaning to it). So, given an 
algebra of propositions 'P and a KR system I:, we are 
interested in a function 
l ·llr : Zr. � P 
which maps each sentence a of Zr. to the proposition 
llallr.e, connoted by a according to!. We callll·llr. a 
meaning function for I.. We will see in Section 4 how 
we can defme this function for a given formal account 
of a KR system. 
DS Belief Bases, to be defmed shortly, will use the 
mapping IHir. to bridge �r. and 'f. As a matter of fact, 
belief will be entertained-and manipulated through DS 
theory-on the space 'f of propositions, but we will 
use the language ZI to express our knowledge. The 
advantage of this is that the whole framework may be 
defmed in general terms, irrespective of the particular 
Z :t that we decide to use. The situation is illustrated 
below. 
•
11·11 
e9
·.·.·.·., DS 
__:_, .-:-:-:�
·
:-: .. :.. �:: 
-/ . . · v :· ... �,� ·.·.·.·.·.·. ·.· "' . . .. . . . . . . 
3. Dempster-Shaler's Belief Bases 
In proposing his "functional approach to Knowledge 
Representation", Levesque (1984) suggested modelling 
knowledge by means of abstract data types 
("Knowledge Bases'') characterized in terms of the op-
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erations that can be made on them; typical operations 
are a query operation "Ask", an update operation 
"Tell", and an initialization operation "Empty". 
Adapting Levesque's suggestion to the case of uncer­
tain knowledge, we will defme "Dempster-Shafer's 
Belief Bases" (or "Belief Bases'') as abstract data types 
where knowledge and belief about this knowledge are 
represented according to a specific KR language and to 
OS theory, respectively. Belief Bases for a given KR 
system l: will be characterized by three primitive opera­
tions (13,13, denotes the class of Belief Bases): 
Askt: �t X 13,13, � ([0,1] X [0,1]) 
Tellt : �t X ([0, l]X[O,l]) X 13,13, -7 13,13, 
Empty t : { 0 J � 13,13, 
whose intended semantic is as follows. Askt deter­
mines to what extent a sentence is believed (according 
to DS theory) to hold (according to the logic of l:) in a 
Belief Base; Tellt returns a new Belief Base obtained 
by acquiring a new piece of evidence; and Emptyt 
provides an "empty" Belief Base, where nothing is be­
lieved except the valid sentences of �t· 
In order to define the above operations more pre­
cisely, we have to specify the structure of Belief Bases. 
Given a Boolean algebra � of propositions, we will 
model Belief Bases as sets of pairs <P, mp> with P an 
element of� and mp a real number in [0,1]. Intuitively, 
each Belief Base represents a BPA on � 2• 
Correspondingly, Emptyi[] will return a vacuous 
BPA, allocating all the mass to the tautology U; the pair 
returned by Askt[CX,lC] will contain the values of bel" 
for the asked proposition3 and its complement, respec­
tively; and Tellt[a,<xttxr>,lC] will return the new 
BPA obtained by combining, by Dempster's combina­
tion, the old BPA 1C with a BPA representing a piece of 
evidence saying: «I believe to a degree Xt that ex is true, 
and to a degree xr that it is false". Before going to the 
formal defmition, we need to restate some of the basic 
elements of DS theory in terms of our generic Boolean 
algebra � (with =>, f"'l, c, U and 0 as above) and of 
sets of pairs <P, mp>4: 
2 As reminded in the Introduction, the usual formulation of DS 
theory is given starting with a set 8 of hypotheses, and by then 
defining BPA's and belief functions over the power-set of 8 
(which is a Boolean algebra). Here, on the contrary, we formu­
late the theory directly on a generic Boolean algebra J». The two 
formulations are equivalent 
3 Short fell' "the proposition connoted by the asked sentence". 
4 Bel (U) = 1 and Bel (0) = 0 will follow from clef. 3.3 below. 1C 1C 
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Def. 3.1. Let "f be a Boolean algebra as above, and 
let lC be a set of pairs <P, mp>. with Pe �and mpe 
[0,1]. Then,for any Qe "f, we let 
Bel'IC(Q) =df I, (mp I <P, mp>e lC and P => Q} 
Def. 3.2. Let "f be a Boolean algebra and K1 and 'IS 
two sets of pairs as above. Then, Dempster's combi­
!lllli2n of JC1 and 'IS is given by 
1C1 E91S =dt { <Q, fnQ>I mQ = p� �m,..ml'" 
Q=P'rV'" 
<J'' ,m,..>e 'ICI' <f'" ,wtr>E 'IS 
ifp12�. it is undefined otherwise; p12 is given by: 
p12 =1-I, mpomr for aii<P',m,.>e �e1 ,<P",m/'">E "2 sJ. P'nP"=0 
} 
We have now all the ingredients for giving the func­
tional definition of Belief Bases for a given KR system. 
Def. 3.3. Let f> be a Boolean algebra of propositions 
as above. Let l: be a KR system and 11·111: a meaning 
function for 1:. Then Dempster-Shafer Belief Bases 
on I are defined by the following operations: 
Emptyt[] =df {<U, 1>} 
Askl:[a, 1C] =df < Be�(llalll:)' Be�(CIIalll:) > 
Tellt[a, <xttxr>, K] =dr 
= lC 9 { <llcxllt,Xt>, <cllcxllt,Xf>, <U,1-XrXt>) 
provided that, in TellD the evidence represented by a 
is distinct from that represented by 1C. 
A Belief Base on I is built starting with Emptyt[], 
and then by performing successive Tel� operations on 
it Hence, as desired, a Belief Bases on l: turns out to 
be a set of a pairs <P, mp>, with Pe � and mpe [0,1], 
such that all the mp 's add up to 1. We interact with 
Belief Bases, via the above operations, by using � 
�of �t for expressing our knowledge, and num­
bers in (0,1] for expressing our belief in the truth (or 
falsity) of this knowledge. However, we emphasise 
once again that mass of belief is actually allocated to the 
propositions connoted by these sentences, and not to 
the sentences themselves. We will see examples of 
Belief Bases in the next sections. Nevertheless, just to 
keep the curiosity of the reader burning, we show here 
a typical use of a Belief Base where First Order Logic 
has been chosen to represent knowledge. 
AskPOL[Q(x), TellPOL[P(x), <0.6, 0.3>, 
Tell,01JV'x.P(x):::>Q(x), <0.8, 0>, EmptyroLO)]] = 
= <0.48, 0> 
Belief Bases "behave well" as hybrid structures; that is, 
they preserve all the properties of both DS theory and 
the used KR system. For instance, we haveS: 
Lemma 3.1. 
i) Ask [a Empty[)]= 
{<l,O>ifaisvf!-lidini; l: ' l: <0,0> otherwise 
ii) Askl:[a, Te11rU3, <1,0>, Emptyl:[]]] = 
_ { <1, 0> if� logically implies a in I ;  
- <0, 0> otherwise 
So, Belief Bases on I obey the logic of I, and they 
just mirror this logic when belief measures are restricted 
to be 0 or 1. On the other hand, any DS model can be 
captured in our framework: 
Theorem 3.1. Let A=(9,m 1 , ... ,mk) be aDS 
model, where e is a frame of discernment and the 
mi 's areBPA 's on 9; let m = $imi. 
Then there is a formal system I..o\ and a Belief Base 
Km on I..\ such that, for all A� 9 
Ask:t}P A•Km]=<Xt.Xf> iffxt:=belm(A), XFbe/m(-A) 
where P A is the sentence of �:t.t expressing "the an­
swer to A is in A", and helm is the standard belief 
function associated to m. 
4. Modelling a Belief Base 
We tum now to considering the problem of instantiating 
Belief Bases to particular cases of interest, i.e. to defme 
specific Belief Bases for some given KR system I. 
This is made in two steps: the fust step is  to chose a 
particular way of modelling propositions, i.e. to defme 
the elements of the set f' and the relation => on it; the 
second step consists in defming a meaning function ll·l'r 
for the specific KR system we want to use, based on a 
suitable formalization of iL 
A fU"St possibility for modelling f', fairly usual in the 
logical tradition, is to identify a proposition with a set 
of possible worlds, namely those worlds in which that 
proposition holds. For the sake of generality, we con­
sider here Kripke structures6 of the form M = <SM, 
DM, VM, {1\Mi I i � 0}>, where SM is a set of states, 
DM is a domain of individuals, V M is a mapping from 
symbols of � and states s• SM to elements (and sets) 
of DM, and the 1\ M/s are binary relations over SM. A 
Kripke (or "possible'') world is a pair <M,S> with s• 
SM. f' is then given by the power-set of the set of all 
Kripke worlds, equipped with the standard � relation. 
5 Tbe proofs of the.e results are given in the full paper. 
6 Other mathematical sttuctures used to give semantics to lan­
guages could have been taken here. The reader unfamiliar with 
Kripkc structures is referred to e.g. (Hughes & Cresswell, 1968). 
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Let us now consider having a KR system I . 1n order 
to build a meaning function 11·111: for it, we need to have 
a truth relation "' r defining the notion of truth in a 
world. This means that a formalization of I of the form 
( � l:' "'1:> is needed. The "' l: relation will in general be 
defined only on certain types of Kripke strucrures Mr; 
correspondingly, only certain Kripke worlds will be 
considered. We denote by H) l: the set of worlds on 
which the semantics of I is defined. We then let the 
proposition connoted by a in !: be the set of all the 
possible worlds in H) l: where a holds according to "'I:' 
We define the function 11·111:: �l: -7 f' accordingly: 
Def. 4.1. Let I and lY l: be as above. Then, for each 
sentence ae �l:' we let: llcx.llr =df {w•IY:E I wi-I.a } . 
We can now interpret defmition 3.3 in tenns of possible 
worlds. Belief Bases on I are sets of pairs <P ,mp> 
with P a subset of k)r and mp• [0,1]: intuitively, they 
represent BPA's on the set of all the possible worlds 
for I. The condition "P=>Q" in the defmition of Bel 1C 
reads .. P�Q" in the chosen model for f'. This condi­
tion corresponds to logical entailment between sen-
tences of �I:: given two sentences a and �. 11f311l: �llcxJII. 
is true whenever { w I wl- l:f3} � ( w I w Ia l:a}, that is 
whenever ��- l:a.. Askl:[a,K] measures the total belief 
committed to the set of possible worlds llcx.lll: (and to its 
complement) by the BPA K. Telll:[a,<Xt.Xf>,JC] adds 
to JC all the intersections of the propositions already in JC 
with llalll: and with CJialll:. Very roughly, each set of 
worlds P in JC is split into three subsets: those worlds in 
P where a holds, those where a does not hold, and P 
itself. Mass of belief is then redistributed over all the 
resulting sets according to Dempster's combination. 
Finally, Empty l:[] allocates all the mass of belief to the 
whole set W l:; as all and only the valid sentences of !: 
hold in all possible worlds, then all and only the valid 
sentences of I will be believed (with unitary belief) in 
the empty Belief Base. 
Example 1. We can use Belief Bases to link together DS 
theory and First Order Logic (FOL). Consider (�POL' "'POJ, 
where �POL and "'POL are the language and the truth relation 
for FOL, �tively. 1J POL is the set of worlds <MFOL .sc)>, 
with M..oL = <{so},D,V> such that <D,V> is a standard 
FOL interpretation structure. We therefore have: llcxii,0L= 
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{ <M.so> I <M.so>'"POLa}; i.e. llall,ac. is the set of all first 
order models for a. �. Tel� and Empty POL are plainly 
defmed according to defmition 3.3, by substituting llaiiPOL to 
llaii:E and k',ac. to U. In the resulting Belief Bases, knowl­
edge will be represented in first order logic, and belief about 
it will obey OS theory. The picture below illustrates the 
Belief Base K obtained by ( 1Co stands for Empty JI'OLD): 
Ks TellPOL[ dog(Alex), <.0.7, 0.1>, 
TellPOL[ 'v'x.(dog(x) :::> animal(x)}, <.0.9, 0>, Ko)] 
c;A 1111111111111�� 
The vertically shaded part comprises worlds in which 
"'v'x.(dog(x) ::> animal(x))" is true; the horizontally shaded 
one, worlds in which "dog(Alex)" is true; D corresponds to 
ll'v'x.(dog(x) :::> animal(x)) " dog(Alex)IIPOL" The flrst Tell 
allocates a mass of 0.9 to the subset BuD, and 0.1 to the 
whole space AuBuCuD. The second Tell combines this 
BPA with one in which a mass of 0.7 is allocated to CuD, 
0.1 to AuB, and 0.2 to AuBuCuD. In the resulting Belief 
Base K, a mass of 0.02 is being allocated to AuBuCuD, 
O.Ql to AuB, 0.07 to CuD, 0.18 to BuD, 0.09 to B, and 
0.63 to D. By defmition of FOL interpretation, the sentence 
"animal(Alex)" will Wliformly hold in D (while it will in 
general hold in some of-but not all-the worlds in A, B 
and C); this means that the only proposition in K which en­
tails llanimal(Alex)IIPOL is D, while no proposition entails 
11-animal(Alex)ll.c..  Hence: 
Askwru_[animal(Alex), K] = <.0.63, 0> 
Example 2. We continue Example 1 by showing how 
the Tweety problem may be formulated with Belief Bases on 
FOL (Ko is as above; we omit for short the subscript FOL): 
K1 = Tell[('v'x.(bird(x) A -excp(x)) ::> flier(x}), <1 ,0>, Ko] 
1'2 = Tell[('v'x. -excp(x)), <0.8, 0.2>, K1] 
K:l=Tell[('v'x.(penguin(x) :::> (bird(x)A-flier(x))}},<1 ,0>,1'21 
�= Tell[ bird(Tweety), <1, O>,KJ 
K, = Tell[ bird(Cippy), <1, 0>, �1 
K6 = Tell[ penguin(Tweety), <1, 0>, K,) 
Then we have, in Ks: 
Ask[ flier(Tweety), Ks] = <.0.8, 0> 
Ask[ flier(Cippy}, Ksl = <.0.8, 0> 
and, in "6: 
Ask[ flier(Tweety), 1CJ = <.0, 1> 
Ask[ flier(Cippy}, 1CJ = <.0.8, 0> 
Ask[ excp(Tweety}, "6) = <1, 0> 
Ask[ excp(Cippy), "6) = <.0, 0.8> 
Example 3. We consider M-KRYPTON, an extension of 
the KRYPTON hybrid KR system (Brachman et al., 1985), 
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developed to model the interaction between multiple agents; 
in particular, M-KRYPTON can express sentences like 
(B, a), read "agent i believes7 that a"; a full description of 
M-KRYPTON is given in (Saffiotti & Sebastiani, 1988). 
Apart from its expressive power, the interest in using M­
KRYPTON here lies iil its semantics being defmed in a pos­
sible world framework, in terms of a truth relation '"MJC" 
Belief Bases on M-KRYPTON = (�-·'"-) are plainly 
given by def. 3.3, by letting llaii:E = (ro•k'-,1 (I)F_,a} 
and U = k' Mit (where k' _ is the set of Kripke worlds on 
which '"Mit is defmed). We illustrate the behaviour of the re­
sulting Belief Bases on the following interesting problem: 
"After a long discussion, Robert and Alex came to a good 
agreement about which individuals are (or are not) hUiniln; 
also, most probably Alex knuws thai pets are animals owned 
by humans. Given that Alex knows that Tweety is a pet, and 
that Philippe owns it, will Robert believe Philippe a hUiniln?" 
K1sTellM�:[(FORAIL X (B11(Human x))H(Bbob(Human x))), 
<0.8, 0>, EmptyMJt[)] 
�S=TellM�:[(B11(IS Pet (VRGeneric Animal owner Human))), 
<0.98, 0>, ICI) 
!C:J=TellM�:l<Ba�(AND (Pet tweety) (owner tweety philippe))), 
<1, 0>, 1'21 
Then: Ask,u[(Bbob(Human philippe)), JS] = <.0.784, 0> 
Notice that the kind of knowledge represented in this exam­
ple is to no respect a trivial one: the flrst Tell expresses a 
contingent relation between the beliefs held by two different 
agents; the second one expresses the belief of an agent to­
ward a terminological defmition; and the third one expresses 
the belief of an agent toward some assertions. All these 
types of knowledge are captured by the mechanisms of M­
KRYPTON. By contrast, a formalization of this problem in a 
standard OS formalism appears far from being obvious. 
We switch now to a different way of modelling 
propositions. There are two reasons for doing this: to 
illustrate an alternative way to model Belief Sets 
(needed, e.g., if a proof-theoretic account of the KR 
system we want to use is available, rather than a model­
theoretic one); and to get closer to the practical side of 
Belief Bases (as we will discuss in the next Section). 
We will model propositions in terms of more "tangible" 
syntactical structures, rather than semantical ones. 
Informally, given a sentence a. of � :E' we consider 
those sets of sentences of �I: such that a. is deducible 
from them in l:; the proposition connoted by a. in l: 
consists of the collection of all these sets of sentences. 
More formally, given a proof-theoretic account of a 
KR system l: = (�:E' 1-:E), we defme a possible argu-
ment in l: to be any consistent set of sentences of �:E. 
In order to avoid unnecessary complexities, we also re-
1 The traditional epistemic notion of (categorical) beliefis meant 
here, with no mference to Dempster-Sbafer's belief. 
quire possible arguments to be non-redundant, i.e. 
none of the sentences � in a possible argument 1t must 
be provable by the other sentences in 1t through 1-t. We 
denote by � t the set of all possible arguments in I:. 
We then redefine the function ll·llt: �I-+ � in terms 
of of possible argumentsB: 
Def.4.2. Let I: and � t be as above. Then, for each 
sentence a of �I' we let llafii =df {tte �I ltti-Ia } . 
The algebra of propositions � has now sets of subsets 
of �I as its elements, and again � as its partial order. 
Hence, definition 3.3 may now be read in the following 
way. Belief Bases represent BPA's on �t· The condi-
tion "P�Q" ("P �Q'') in the definition of Belx should 
now be interpreted in terms of deducibility: given two 
sentences a and� of 2:::!:, II�III�IIcxllt is true whenever 
{ 1t Itt I-I�}  � { 1t ltti-Ia} ; this means that, whatever 
argument is valid among the possibilities in fi�III (in 
particular, {�} itself), it must prove a as well, that is 
�1-Ia.. Aski[a,K] measures the total belief committed 
to llaiii (and to its complement) by the BPA K. 
Telli[a,<xt;Xf>,K] considers all the sets of possible 
arguments in K; each of them is intersected with the sets 
in lla.III and in cncx11I in the course of Dempster's com­
bination. Very roughly, each set P in 1C is split into 
three subsets: those possible arguments in P that prove 
a, those that prove -a, and P itself. Mass of belief is 
then redistributed over all the resulting sets of possible 
arguments. Finally, Empty I[] allocates all the mass of 
belief to the whole CII; as tti-Ia holds for each 1t if and 
only if a is a theorem of I:, then all and only the theo­
rems of I: will be believed (with unitary belief) in the 
empty Belief Base. 
Example 4. Any KR system for which a proof theory is 
provided can be used to define Belief Bases, by defining II· III 
as in def. 4.2. So, we could textually repeat here Example 2 
by using 1-I'Cll. instead of"" I'Cll.: the behaviour of the resulting 
Belief Bases would be exactly the same. As a matter of fact, 
the particular way propositions are modelled (and corre-
8 When �t comprises a conjunction operator " satisfying 
" { a,ji) 1-y iff { aAji) 1-'f', and a disjunction operator v satisfying 
"{a}l-yOI' {ji)l-yiff {avji)l-'f', a (finite) set of possible argu­
ments {1tj I 1tj={liu .... ,IJiNi}} is equivalent to the sentence of 
�t "Vj(Aj liip"· In this case, we could �nt propositions by 
sentences of �t' However, this is not ttuc in general. 
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spondingly the way-model theoretic or proof theoretic-in 
which the formalization of the KR system is given) is com­
pletely transparent to the user of the resulting Belief Bases. 
5. A Stairway to Concreteness 
We focus in this section on the practical side of Belief 
Bases: we discuss a possible architecture for a modular 
system embodying Belief Bases, and we consider a 
possible approach to its implementation. The proof-the­
oretic modelling of Belief Bases discussed above pro­
vides a hook for pursuing our program. In fact, 
switching from possible worlds to possible arguments 
allows us, by going down to the syntactic level, to get 
closer to the practical side of our Belief Bases9. We 
sketch a fll'St architecture for our system: 
Ask 
BB 
In this architecture, the Belief Base is 
considered as an internally stored data structure (BB); 
as a consequence, we use primitive operations 
Emptyt[], Aski[a] and Teiii[a,<xt,Xf>l where the 
Belief Base argument is omitted (reference to the 
internal BB being implicit). The inspect and update 
modules implement these operations, i.e. they 
implement the interface mechanism and the OS calculus 
on the propositions in BB. The KR system 1: 
constibltes a neatly distinct module (possibly an already 
existing system) whose role is to provide lla.III. for each 
sentence a of the KR language. When llaiii is a set of 
possible arguments for a, this role is not completely 
detached from a plausible behaviour for a KR system; 
yet, as this set includes .ill the possible arguments 
according to the logic I:, irrespective of what is actually 
believed in BB, llaiii is in general a computationally 
intractable objectiO. Two steps may be undertaken at 
this stage: 
1. to only consider possible arguments which are 
"reasonable" with respect to what is actually believed 
in the Belief Base; and 
2. to let I: provide "fragments" of possible arguments, 
generated while performing inferences; the recon­
struction of full possible arguments from these frag-
ments js then performed outside I:. 
9 Formally, this change is pretty iirelevant: possible worlds ac­
lUally c:onespond to classes of equivalence of elements of Cli. 
10 Notice that the full set Cli for a langlllge with n atomic sen­
tences will in general comprise at least 22" elements. 
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Step 1 implies that � must access BB to decide which 
(possible) inferences to draw in order to find 
"reasonable" possible arguments (alternatively, knowl­
edge in BB may be cached in a Knowledge Base inter-
nal to�). To exemplify, only those possible arguments 
in Cl * could be considered at any moment, where Cl * 
is the subset of Cl t comprising only the sentences 
which have occurred up to now in a Tell operation. The 
effect of this is to drastically reduce the average number 
and size of possible arguments. 
Step 2 greatly weakens the demands on�. switching 
to a requirement more easily fulfilled by typical KR 
systems. In a plausible scenario, fragments could cor­
respond to reports of single inference steps: hence, they 
might be seen as ATMS (deKleer, 1986) justifications, 
and the burden of reconstructing full possible argu­
ments from them might be carried on by an A TMS 
linked to�. Intuitively, and very roughly, the possible 
arguments for a. correspond to the environments in the 
label built by the A TMS for the nodell 'Ya· given a set 
of justifications communicated by � while looking for 
possible ways of deducing a.. Asking a. means comput­
ing a belief value for the labels of 'Ya and of 'Y-a· by 
summing up the mass given to each environment in 
them. Telling a. means justifying a. and -a. by a pair of 
assumptions A and A with the appropriate mass values 
attached. This algorithm is summarized below: 
Tellt[a., <xt.xr>] 
1. Ask l: to try to deduce both a and -a(i� in the deduction, each 
inference P1 .... 1Jt_1 I IJt performed by l: will be c:omrmmicatcd 
to the ATMS as a justification "(�1, .. ,"(�_1 � 'Y�· 2 Create new A TMS assumptions r A and r A• and communicate 
justifications r A � 'Ya; r A � 'Y-a; and r A• r A � .L 
3. Store xt and Xf as the masses of assumptions r A and r A. 
Askt[a.] 
1. The same as step 1 of Tell. 
2 Ask the A TMS the labels of 'Y-a and of 'Ya 
3. Compute the value of Bel( a) by summing up the masses of all 
the environments in the label of 'Ya (products of the masses of 
all the assul111ltions c:omprisin2 it); do the same for Bel(-a)(ii)_ 
l::!.f1J.u.: 
i) "try to deduce" may involW! firtding all 1M potefltiol tkd��e-
lions, or ordy those grOIIIIded on belUved Jawwledge 
ii) Some prectllllion must be IIJUn in ortkr for tlte environmeflts 
to be disioirlt (cf. Laskey-Leimer, 1989). 
Notice that the number of computations performed by 
the algorithm above is, in general, large. Usual A TMS 
algorithms for computing labels are exponential in the 
11 We write 'Ya to refer to the ATMS node associated to the 
value "true" for a; correspondingly, we also as�ate an ATMS 
node 'Y-a to the value "false" for a. r A denote as usual the 
ATMS node associated with the (truth of the) assumption A. 
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number of assumptions; also, the number of elements 
in the labels tend to grow exponentially with the num­
ber of assumptions. As the number of assumptions in 
the algorithm above is proportional to the number of 
Tellt operations, the complexity of computing 
Askt[a.] will in general be exponential in the number 
of Tellt performed up to now12. This should not sur­
prise us, as the computational complexity of the obvi­
ous algorithm for computing Dempster's combination is 
exponential in the size of the frame of discernment 
6. Discussion and Related Work 
Workers on DS theory have traditionally been rather 
unconcerned with the linguistic structures used to rep­
resent knowledge. The usual attitude consists in leaving 
to the user the burden of expressing the knowledge rel­
evant to her problem in the mathematical framework 
provided by DS theory, i.e. by means far away from 
the languages most commonly used in knowledge rep­
resentation. This appears to be a general attitude in the 
field of uncertain reasoning. In some case, some atten­
tion has been devoted to the linguistic aspect, as in 
(Zadeh, 1989); however, Zadeh advocates the use of 
Fuzzy Logic � a KR tool, while we suggest to com­
bine DS theory with a KR tool. Other frameworks (like 
some of the existing Expert System Shells) have occa­
sionally been developed in which both the need of rep­
resenting knowledge and that of representing uncer­
tainty have been taken into considerations. In them, 
however, uncertainty is either part of the language, or it 
is attached to sentences of the language. In our ap­
proach, on the contrary, uncertainty is attached to the 
knowledge itself, rather than to the linguistic structures 
used to represent it Notice that this approach carries 
with it an interpretation of uncertainty (or, more pre­
cisely, epistemic uncertainty) as meta-knowledge about 
the validity of our knowledge with respect to an intrin­
sically certain reality: let us consider the two statements 
a) I am 80% sure that birds fly 
b) 80% of birds fly 
statement (a) illustrates our notion of uncertain knowl­
edge: we can see it as a categorical implication (e.g. 
"V'x.bird(x)-.fly(x)'') accompanied by (epistemic) 
uncertainty information; on the contrary, we regard (b) 
as an example of categorical knowledge which refers to 
a statistical (but epistemically sure) fact 
The main outcome of this paper is the defmition of 
Belief Bases, abstract data types capable of representing 
Dempster-Shafer's belief about structured knowledge 
expressed in some KR language. The "good behaviour" 
of Belief Bases, as shown by lemma 3.1 and theorem 
3.1, guarantees that the properties of both the KR sys­
tem used and of DS theory are preserved in the combi­
nation. From the point of view of workers in knowl-
12 We would obtain the same result by considering the general 
proof-theoretic definition, with the above restriction on the Cl*. 
edge representation, Belief Bases constitute a tool for 
attaching a well-grounded and powerful treaunent of 
uncertainty to a KR system. From the point of view of 
people fond of DS theory, they provide a means for 
extending the applicability of DS theory to kinds of 
knowledge and problems whose formalization in a DS 
framework would otherwise be far from obvious. To 
be sure, the addition of simply the full flrst order logic 
to DS theory (cf. Example 1) is already a non-trivial re­
sult in terms of the expressiveness of the theory. For 
instance, the following situation would be hardly ex­
pressible in a standard use of DS theory (e.g. the multi­
variate approach): 
�e1= Tel1POL[''<tx.(3y.spouse(x,y)-+married(x)), <0.98, 0:>, 
Empty POL(]] 
"2= TellPOL[ spouse(Roben, Alice), <0.7, 0:>, �e1] 
Aski'OL[ manied(Roben) , �] = <0.686, 0:> 
Moreover, using KR languages other than FOL allows 
us to express belief about more complex notions (e.g. 
epistemic attitudes of multiple agents-d. Example 3) 
or fmer distinctions (e.g. the distinction between termi­
nological and assertionaJ knowledge�e example). 
The possible world formalization given in this work 
is related to other possible world accounts given to 
Dempster-Shafer's theory (e.g. Ruspini, 1986; Fagin 
and Halpern, 1989). However, our focus here is the 
linking of DS theory to an arbitrary KR system, by us­
ing propositions as a formal bridge: possible worlds are 
just one possible choice for modelling propositions. 
Moreover, the above referred accounts are normally re­
stricted to considering the propositional case, while the 
approach presented here allows us to extend DS theory 
to any suitable formal language. On a different side, the 
A TMS-based algorithm proposed for Belief Bases is 
extremely similar to some recent proposal to use A TMS 
for implementing DS theory (D'ambrosio, 1988; 
Laskey & Lehner, 1989). This similarity is intriguing, 
as both the staning point and the goal of the authors 
above are apparently different from the ones here: in 
their proposals, a DS model is mapped into a set of 
ATMS justifications plus a set of A TMS assumptions 
with attached probability values. The A TMS is used as 
a mechanism to perform belief propagation in a sym­
bolic way; computing then the probability of the A TMS 
label for the A TMS node representing a value for a 
variables gives us the belief in that variable taking that 
value. On the contrary, we are not concerned at all with 
fitting a general DS model into an ATMS: rather, 
A TMS is coupled in a standard way to a KR system (or 
Problem Solver) and used as a computational mecha­
nism to reconstruct the "possible arguments" (A TMS 
environments) for a node given the set of justifications 
produced by the KR system in the deduction process. 
These possible arguments constitute, independently of 
the way they are computed, the basis for the computa­
tion of belief according to definition 3.3. 
359 
The approach presented here is extensible to other 
uncertainty calculi. In particular, it is possible to defme 
a formal framework in which both a specific KR sys­
tem and a speciflc uncertainty calculus are "plugged in" 
as modules. This general framework is presented in 
(Saffiotti, 1990a), while (Safflotti, 1990b) elaborates 
on its architecture on the lines hinted at in Section 5. 
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